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COLLOQUIUM
CORPORATE LAWYERS: ETHICAL AND
PRACTICAL LAWYERING WITH VANISHING
GATEKEEPER LIABILITY
FOREWORD
Marc I. Steinberg*
INTRODUCTION
I am pleased to author the introductory article for the Fordham Law
Review’s insightful Colloquium focusing on the corporate attorney. As the
articles in this Colloquium illustrate, the role of the corporate lawyer—both
as in-house and outside counsel—is instrumental in effectuating ethical
lawyering, sound corporate governance practices, and law compliance.1
These timely contributions that are summarized at a later point in this Article2
comprise a valuable resource to assess the functions, obligations, and
perceptions of the corporate attorney, as well as the public policy
ramifications of counsel’s conduct.
At least since the 1970s, the corporate lawyer’s instrumental role in
shaping the client company’s culture and conduct has been a subject of
analysis by courts,3 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),4 bar

* Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law; Director, SMU
Dedman School of Law, Corporate Counsel Externship Program. I thank Casey Fraser and
Adrian Galvan, both members of the Texas Bar, for their significant contributions. A number
of the authors of articles from the Colloquium provided edits to descriptions of their respective
contributions which I have incorporated herein.
1. For my law school text on this subject, see Marc I. Steinberg & Stephen B. Yeager,
INSIDE COUNSEL: PRACTICES, STRATEGIES, AND INSIGHTS (2d ed. 2020).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489
F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990);
Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Conn.
1987).
4. See, e.g., SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); Carter
& Johnson, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 1981 WL 384414 (Feb. 28, 1981); Hodgin,
Exchange Act Release No. 16,225, Securities Act Release No. 6131, 18 SEC Docket 458
(Sept. 27, 1979).
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associations,5 and commentators.6 As exemplified by the articles in this
Colloquium, this dialogue continues today, as traditional topics are revisited
and new subjects are explored. Nonetheless, one pressing development
merits scrutiny: although the multifaceted issues implicating corporate
counsel remain vibrant, the specter of liability has dramatically decreased.
For decades, corporate counsel has been characterized as a “gatekeeper.”7
Serving in that capacity, the corporate attorney acts as the red or green light
to the consummation of securities transactions as well as other endeavors
sought to be undertaken by the client.8 This gatekeeper role remains intact
today.9 However, what has fundamentally changed is the liability exposure
for attorneys who fail—either negligently or knowingly—in performing this
function.10 Hence, the key premise of this Article is that, while corporate
counsel’s adherence to ethical norms comprises an important component of
sound corporate governance and law compliance, failure to do so ordinarily
does not incur attorney liability exposure. The consequence, as the
discussion in this Article’s next Part will address, is the vanishing of
gatekeeper liability.
I. THE VANISHING OF GATEKEEPER LIABILITY
It remains true that corporate attorneys continue to face liability exposure
to their clients for malpractice11 and to nonclients when authoring opinion

5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.2, 1.6, 1.13, 1.16, 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2018); see also ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992).
See generally Report of the New York City Bar Association Task Force on the Lawyer’s Role
in Corporate Governance, 62 BUS. LAW. 427 (2007); The Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged in Securities Practice—A Report by the Committee
on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, 30 BUS. LAW. 1289 (1975).
6. See generally MARC I. STEINBERG, ATTORNEY LIABILITY AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY
(Supp. 2018); Samuel H. Gruenbaum, Corporate/Securities Lawyers:
Disclosure,
Responsibility, Liability to Investors, and National Student Marketing Corp., 54 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 795 (1979); Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the Public
Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 423 (1978); Morgan Shipman, The Need
for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal
Securities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231 (1973).
7. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916
(1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1293 (2003); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
8. See, e.g., Spectrum, 489 F.2d at 536; United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863
(2d Cir. 1964); Felts v. Nat’l Account Sys. Ass’ns, 469 F. Supp. 54, 59–60 (N.D. Miss. 1978);
Gruenbaum, supra note 6, at 804.
9. See, e.g., Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 449 (2014) (“Emphasizing the
importance of outside professionals as ‘gatekeepers who detect and deter fraud,’ the Senate
Report concludes: ‘Congress must reconsider the incentive system that has been set up that
encourages accountants and lawyers who come across fraud in their work to remain silent.’”
(quoting S. REP. NO. 10-146, at 2 (2002))).
10. See infra notes 44–122 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (2019 ed.).
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letters that are designed to be relied on by such third parties.12 Moreover, in
certain instances, attorneys under state law may incur liability for fraud13 and
for aiding and abetting violations of applicable state securities laws,14 as well
as breaches of fiduciary duty or fraud committed by corporate fiduciaries
(such as those perpetrated by directors and officers).15 Outside of these
settings, in the performance of a corporate attorney’s customary tasks, the
incurrence of liability is relatively rare.16
The premise of this discussion is to illustrate that the liability of the
corporate attorney to nonclients today is greatly diminished as compared to
twenty-five years ago.17 This eventuality has been accentuated by the failure
of the SEC to take meaningful action against miscreant corporate counsel
who act solely in their advisory roles.18 Logically, one would conclude that
the corporate attorney’s liability exposure would have become enhanced
after the financial scandals of two decades ago and the 2008 financial crisis.19
Surprisingly, the very opposite has occurred: corporate counsel’s vanishing
gatekeeper liability.20
A. Historical Perspective: Corporate Attorney Liability as Gatekeeper
The corporate counsel as gatekeeper is a fixture that has been entrenched
for nearly half a century.21 Gatekeepers may be defined as follows:
Gatekeepers are reputational intermediaries that, in the securities context,
enhance market integrity by staking their reputation on the credibility of an
investment [or other matter] through their certification, assessment, or
verification of facts surrounding it. Depending on the circumstances,
gatekeepers have the ability to detect and deter fraud. Gatekeeper
reliability is thus an integral component of the integrity of the securities
markets.22

12. See, e.g., Horizon Fin., F.A. v. Hansen, 791 F. Supp. 1561 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (applying
Georgia and Pennsylvania law); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 901 (Ct. App. 1976); Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996).
13. See, e.g., Lawson v. Cagle, 504 So. 2d 226 (Ala. 1987); Brownell v. Garber, 503
N.W.2d 81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Veras Inv. Partners, LLC v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer &
Feld LLP, 851 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 2007)
14. See, e.g., Houston v. Seward & Kissel LLP, No. 07-cv-6305, 2008 WL 818745
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008) (allowing an aiding and abetting claim under Oregon securities
fraud statutes to proceed).
15. See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund V, L.P. v. Mayer Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP,
612 F. Supp. 2d 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying New York law).
16. See infra notes 44–122 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 44–122 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 85–97 and accompanying text.
19. See generally KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS: A TRUE STORY (2005);
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).
20. See infra notes 44–122 and accompanying text.
21. See generally Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014); Choi, supra note 7;
Coffee, supra note 7; Kraakman, supra note 7.
22. Marc I. Steinberg & James Ames, From the Regulatory Abyss: The Weakened
Gatekeeping Incentives Under the Uniform Securities Act, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 4–5
(2016).
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As the SEC observed in Fields,23 handed down in 1973, the securities
attorney “works in his office where he prepares prospectuses, proxy
statements, opinions of counsel, and other documents that we, our staff, the
financial community, and the investing public must take on faith.”24
Similarly, as the Second Circuit asserted that same year, “[e]ffective
implementation of [the securities laws’] safeguards . . . depends in large
measure on the members of the bar who serve in an advisory capacity to those
engaged in securities transactions.”25 Hence, the corporate attorney’s
function as gatekeeper has been a constant presence for several decades.26
As broadly expressed by Fred Zacharias, “[l]awyers are gatekeepers and
always have been.”27
Consistent with this rationale, private and SEC actions against corporate
lawyers based on noncompliance with their gatekeeping function occurred
with regularity prior to the mid-1990s.28 With significant frequency,
securities attorneys were sued as aiders and abettors in private actions under
the key antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws—section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 193429 and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.30 The SEC likewise invoked these provisions in numerous
enforcement actions against attorneys.31 In addition, the commission utilized
its Rule 2(e) disciplinary authority32 against legal counsel who allegedly
23. Securities Act Release No. 5404, 1973 WL 149285 (June 18, 1973).
24. Id. at *3 n.20.
25. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1973).
26. See supra notes 7–9, 21–25 and accompanying text.
27. Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2004);
see Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2245
(2004) (“By withholding his or her support (such as a lawyer’s opinion letter or an
accountant’s certification), the professional gatekeeper may be able to prevent the fraud.”).
28. See generally Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991); SEC
v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); Spectrum, 489 F.2d 535; Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n
v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990); SEC v. Elec. Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53 (D.
Conn. 1988), aff’d, 891 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989); Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen,
Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Conn. 1987); Morgan v. Prudential Grp., Inc.,
527 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 729 F.2d 1443 (2d Cir. 1983).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2018).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019); see supra notes 3, 28. The merits of private securities
litigation are succinctly set forth by Steven Ramirez:
First, private enforcement operates in a depoliticized context . . . . [R]obust private actions
operate as a check upon the dangers of agency capture. Second, private claims of securities
fraud require no government bureaucracy or other government funding support, other than the
routine operation of a court system . . . . Third, only private litigation both strips the
fraudfeasor of the benefits of their wrongdoing and compensates the victim . . . . Fourth,
private remedies allow a reduced reliance upon ex ante government regulation . . . . Fifth, the
broad definition of a security for purposes of the federal securities laws assures that virtually
all financial transactions with the ability to disturb financial stability and macroeconomic
conditions fall within the scope of the private remedy under Rule 10b-5.

Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and
Macroeconomonic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 722–26 (2014).
31. See supra notes 3, 4, 8, 23, 25, 28.
32. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e). Rule 2(e) was renumbered to Rule 102(e). Pursuant to
section 602 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Rule 102(e) was codified in significant part
by adding section 4C(a) to the Securities Exchange Act.
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engaged in unprofessional conduct when counseling their clients,33 seeking
to suspend or bar these professionals from practicing before the SEC.34
Of course, since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933,35 attorneys
are subject to liability under section 1136 for issuing materially false and
misleading opinions that are contained in a registration statement.37 That
remains true and represents a rare situation where an attorney realistically
today may incur liability under the federal securities laws.38 In days of
yesteryear, however, more expansive theories of attorney liability were
advanced with some success, including that the defendant lawyer was a
“seller” of the subject securities and, hence, liable under section 12 of the
Securities Act39 to the affected purchasers based on a registration violation40
or a material misstatement contained in an offering document.41 In addition,
with some frequency, legal counsel was sought to be held liable as a control
person of the primary violator.42
The days of expansive attorney liability under the federal securities laws
are gone. Today, outside of section 11 liability, an attorney ordinarily incurs
liability exposure only when she engages in blatant fraud, such as stock
manipulation or insider trading.43 The following discussion focuses on this
changed environment.
B. The Dissipating Liability Exposure of Corporate Counsel
Beginning in 1994, the liability exposure of corporate counsel was
significantly reduced due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.44 that aider and
abettor liability is impermissible in private actions under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. That decision was followed by the enactment of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199545 (PSLRA). PSLRA, among other
33. See generally Gibson, Exchange Act Release No. 18,314, 1981 WL 28249 (Dec. 7,
1981); Hodgin, Exchange Act Release No. 16,225, Securities Act Release No. 6131, 18 SEC
Docket 458 (Sept. 27, 1979); Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No.
15,982, 1979 WL 186370 (July 2, 1979).
34. See sources cited supra notes 4, 23, 33.
35. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77bbbb
(2018)).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2018).
37. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
38. See generally DONALD W. GLAZER ET AL., GLAZER AND FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL
OPINIONS (3d ed. 2008 & Supp. 2018).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 771.
40. Id. § 771(a)(1); cf. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 629–630 (1988) (defining the term
“seller” under section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2). See generally Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 1104 (5th
Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 1914 (1989); Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d
1349 (5th Cir. 1981).
42. See, e.g., In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 709 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Seidel v.
Pub. Servs. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1342 (D.N.H. 1985).
43. See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
44. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
45. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
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provisions,46 greatly enhanced the pleading requirements47 and precluded the
undertaking of discovery, including the production of documents and witness
testimony, until and unless the plaintiff hurdled a motion to dismiss.48 With
these onerous pleading requirements, a large percentage of securities cases
alleging fraud do not proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage.49 Not
surprisingly, due in part to the absence of discovery and the presence of
rigorous pleading mandates, lawyers today are rarely sued in private
litigation alleging violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.50 This
consequence is reinforced by the PSLRA’s limitation of liability to that of
proportionate fault unless the subject defendant acts with actual knowledge
of the fraudulent conduct.51
Seeking to evade the strictures of the PSLRA, plaintiffs filed class actions
in the state courts, predominantly in the California courts.52 Reacting to this
attempt to vitiate the PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 199853 (SLUSA). With certain exceptions,54
SLUSA mandates that securities class actions involving nationally traded
46. Other provisions, for example, include a safe harbor for forward-looking statements
in private securities litigation, provisions addressing contribution and proportionate liability,
and class action reform (such as selection of lead plaintiff). See generally JOHN T. BOSTELMAN
ET AL., PUBLIC COMPANY DESKBOOK: SARBANES-OXLEY AND FEDERAL GOVERNANCE
REQUIREMENTS (2d ed. 2009).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1); see Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 314 (2007) (interpreting the PSLRA’s pleading requirements to require a strong inference
of fraudulent intent).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
49. See STEFAN BOETTRICH & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT
TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2018 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 20 (2019),
https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2019/PUB_Year_End_Trends_012819
_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N62-678U] (“Out of the motions to dismiss for which a court
decision was reached, the following three outcomes classify all of the decisions: granted with
or without prejudice (45%), granted in part and denied in part (30%), and denied (25%).”).
50. See Marc I. Steinberg, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims—Only Part of the Story, 45
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 603, 607 (2014) (stating that collateral actors, including attorneys, are rarely
named as defendants in class actions).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2)(A).
52. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006)
(“Rather than face the obstacles set in their path by the Reform Act, plaintiffs and their
representatives began bringing class actions under state law, often in state court.”). See
generally Lisa L. Casey, Shutting the Doors to State Court: The Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, 27 SEC. REG. L.J. 141 (1999); Richard W. Painter, Responding to a
False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL
L. REV. 1 (1998).
53. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
54. Generally, individual actions, derivative suits, and actions alleging state law violations
in the merger and acquisition context may continue to be brought in state court. In addition,
class actions alleging solely federal claims under the Securities Act (such as section 11 claims)
may continue to be instituted in state court. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 77p(f), 78bb(f)(3); Cyan,
Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018). As expected, the effect of Cyan
is that plaintiffs increasingly are bringing their class actions alleging only federal Securities
Act claims in state court. See Martin L. Seidel & Mary Eaton, The Supreme Court’s Cyan
Decision: Implications for Securities Class Actions, REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG., Apr.
10, 2019, at 69, 71 (observing plaintiffs “flock[ing]” to state courts after Cyan).
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securities must be brought in federal district court with only federal law
applying.55 SLUSA thereby not only requires that these class actions be
instituted in federal court but also precludes the filing of state law claims,
including otherwise applicable state securities law claims as well as claims
premised on breaches of fiduciary duty.56 This legislation thereby drastically
reduces attorney liability exposure, as it forbids the bringing of otherwise
meritorious state law claims.57
Plaintiffs have tried, but thus far have failed, to allege that legal counsel
who drafts a client’s materially misleading disclosure document or otherwise
meaningfully renders advice with respect to the disclosure process is
primarily liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. This position initially
was met with approbation by a number of courts, including the federal district
court in the Enron litigation.58 Nonetheless, this approach ultimately failed
before the Supreme Court.59 Rejecting a flexible “scheme to defraud”
rationale,60 the Court held that plaintiffs must show that they had knowledge
of and relied on the defendant’s alleged misconduct.61 Unless the subject
law firm is identified in the disclosure documents or other materials provided
to investors, proving reliance on the law firm’s allegedly improper conduct
is problematic.62 And, of course, such fraudulent conduct must be
sufficiently alleged without the availability of discovery.63
In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court further restricted primary
liability under Rule 10b-5(b)64 by holding that this provision encompasses
only those persons who “make” the subject material misstatement(s).65
Construing the term “make” narrowly, the Court reasoned that the term is
confined to those who have control over the contents of the subject
statements and the manner in which such statements are disseminated.66

55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1); Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058
(2014).
56. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82–89.
57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
58. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig.), 235 F.
Supp. 2d 549, 610–11 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
59. See generally Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148
(2008).
60. Id. at 159–60 (“Invoking what some courts call ‘scheme liability,’ petitioner
nonetheless seeks to impose liability on respondents even absent a public statement.” (citation
omitted)).
61. Id. at 159 (“No member of the investing public had knowledge, either actual or
presumed, of respondents’ deceptive acts during the relevant times. Petitioner, as a result,
cannot show reliance upon any of respondents’ actions . . . .”).
62. See generally Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010).
63. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2019).
65. See generally Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135
(2011).
66. Id. at 144 (stating that “the maker of a statement is the entity with authority over the
content of the statement and whether and how to communicate it”).
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Because attorneys rarely have such control, the decision provides another
avenue for liability avoidance.67
Lorenzo v. SEC,68 a more recent Supreme Court decision, may give
plaintiffs a glimmer of hope. In this SEC enforcement action, the Court held
that people who disseminate materials knowing they contain disclosure
deficiencies may be liable under specified antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws.69 However, applied to legal counsel, prudent attorneys
decline to act as disseminators of their clients’ disclosure documents to
investors.70 Moreover, even if an expansive “indirect” dissemination
standard were to apply,71 plaintiffs ordinarily still must show that they knew
of and relied on the conduct of the recalcitrant lawyer(s)—a challenging
standard to satisfy. In view of these Supreme Court decisions—precluding
the application of aider liability in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private
actions, along with a narrow construction of primary actor status—corporate
counsel’s liability exposure in federal securities class actions is minimal.72
C. The SEC’s Abstention in Disciplining Corporate Counsel
The SEC has key weapons in its arsenal to use against alleged miscreant
lawyers.73 For example, the SEC has statutory authority to bring
enforcement actions against attorneys based on aiding and abetting violations
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.74 In its administrative enforcement
proceedings, the SEC can pursue attorneys under its cease and desist
authority for “causing” their clients’ misconduct.75 With respect to the
SEC’s disciplinary authority, Rule 102(e) proceedings76 may be instituted
against lawyers based on unethical conduct77 or actions premised on a breach

67. Thus, the decision signifies that attorneys ordinarily will be subject to Rule 10b-5(b)
primary liability exposure only when they themselves “make” a statement, such as an attorney
opinion letter or other communication conveyed to investors. See, e.g., Rubin v. Schottenstein,
Zox & Dun, 143 F.3d 263, 266–68 (6th Cir. 1998); Tr. Co. of La. v. N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d
1478, 1490 (5th Cir. 1997); Kline v. First W. Gov’t Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 491 (3d Cir. 1994).
68. 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019).
69. Id. at 1100 (holding that persons who knowingly disseminate materially false or
misleading statements may be subject to liability under section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act,
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)).
70. If counsel engages in such conduct, she incurs the risk of being a “participant” or
“seller” in the transaction. Cf. Hines v. Data Line Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8, 14 (Wash. 1990).
71. This argument may be based on the “direct or indirect” language of section 10(b). 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018).
72. The major exception to this proposition is if the attorney makes a statement, such as
pursuant to an opinion letter or other communication to investors. See supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
73. See generally MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE:
FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2019–2020).
74. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e).
75. See, e.g., id. § 78u-3.
76. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 33.
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of the SEC’s standards of professional conduct for attorneys.78 In addition,
in the brokerage firm setting, enforcement actions may be brought based on
a subject attorney’s alleged failure to adequately oversee a subordinate
employee under such attorney’s supervision.79
Thus, the SEC’s arsenal is impressive and was historically invoked against
legal counsel with some frequency.80 Attorneys from “Wall Street” firms
were sued by the SEC and law firms, at times, were named as defendants.81
Today, however, unless engaged in palpably improper conduct, such as
insider trading,82 stock manipulation,83 or the issuance of false opinion
letters,84 enforcement actions against attorneys are rare.85 Although the SEC
occasionally will name accounting firms as defendants,86 it declines to do so
in regard to law firms.87 Perhaps most telling is that, since the adoption in

78. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities
Act Release No. 8186, Exchange Act Release No. 47,282, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6)(E); Urban, Securities Act Release No. 66,259, 2012 WL
1024025 (Jan. 26, 2012) (finding the general counsel of a brokerage firm not liable on a failure
to supervise charge).
80. See STEINBERG, supra note 6, §§ 4:01–4:05 (collecting cases).
81. See generally Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982,
1979 WL 186370 (July 2, 1979); Plotkin, Yolles, Siegel & Turner, Exchange Act Release No.
5841, 1977 WL 175975 (July 5, 1977).
82. See generally SEC v. Levoff, No. 2:19-CV-05536 (filed D.N.J. Feb. 13, 2019); SEC
v. Marks, No. 2-CV-12325 (D. Mass. filed Dec. 3, 2002); Wiest, Exchange Act Release No.
72155, 2014 WL 1894492 (May 13, 2014).
83. Cf. SEC v. Zouvas, No. cv-17-00427, 2019 WL 4016687, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 26,
2019) (alleging negligent involvement in a scheme to manipulate the market for the subject
company’s stock).
84. See, e.g., SEC v. Atlas, No. 19-CV-62303 (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 17, 2019).
85. Occasionally, the SEC institutes enforcement actions against attorneys alleging other
types of misconduct. See, e.g., SEC v. Heinen, No. C-07-2214 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 24, 2007)
(alleging fraudulent backdating of stock options by attorneys); SEC v. Isselmann, No. CV-041350 (D. Or. filed Sept. 21, 2004) (instituting proceedings alleging subject company’s general
counsel did not provide key accounting information to the company’s audit committee, board
of directors, or independent auditors); Google, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8523, 2005
WL 82435 (Jan. 13, 2005) (instituting proceedings against Google and its attorney for alleged
registration and disclosure violations). Note that these actions occurred over a decade ago.
See Monson, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,323, 2008 WL 2574441, at *5 (June
30, 2008) (stating that “[a]s far as we are aware, we have not sanctioned attorneys in litigated
enforcement proceedings based on alleged negligent acts or omissions they may have
committed in providing non-public legal advice to clients” and also asserting that “the
Commission has established that it will pursue cases against lawyers who allegedly violate the
securities laws with scienter, render misleading opinions used in public disclosures, or engage
in conduct that would render a non-lawyer liable for the same activity under comparable
circumstances”).
86. See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 87,052, 2019 WL
4596714 (Sept. 23, 2019) (announcing a settlement whereby an accounting firm did not admit
wrongdoing involving the alleged auditor independence violations); Grant Thornton, LLP,
Exchange Act Release No. 76,536, 2015 WL 7755463 (Dec. 2, 2015) (announcing a
settlement whereby the accounting firm admitted wrongdoing in auditor independence
violations).
87. Indeed, insofar as I am aware, the SEC has not named a “prestigious” law firm as a
defendant since the 1980s.
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2003 of its standards of professional conduct,88 mandated by the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002,89 the SEC has not instituted a single proceeding against
an attorney based on an alleged violation of these standards.90 Hence, for
several years, the SEC has refused to invoke statutory and regulatory
mechanisms that clearly come within the ambit of its authority.91
The SEC’s lack of zeal in implementing its rightful authority is not
confined to attorneys. For example, in the aftermath of the financial crisis,
the SEC elected to fine publicly held companies billions of dollars92 while
declining to utilize the control person provision of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193493—even on one occasion—to bring suit against corporate
insiders, including chief executive officers and chief financial officers.94 As
applied to the context of this Colloquium, the point is that, so long as
corporate attorneys perform the “daily grist of the mill”95 and confine their
role to the performance of legal services for their clients,96 the initiation of
enforcement or disciplinary action by the SEC against corporate counsel is
relatively remote.97
D. Corporate Counsel Liability Exposure Under State Law
Unquestionably, corporate counsel’s greatest risk of liability is under state
law. For example, malpractice exposure to one’s client is a continual
concern.98 In the opinion letter setting,99 counsel should be mindful of
liability exposure to intended nonclient recipients based on negligent
misrepresentation.100 In situations involving an alleged breach of fiduciary
88. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities
Act Release No. 8186, Exchange Act Release No. 47,282, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2018).
90. I made this point in my recent book. See MARC I. STEINBERG, THE FEDERALIZATION
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 278–82 (2018).
91. The SEC’s refusal to invoke clear provisions of the securities laws is not confined to
the legal profession. For example, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the SEC
declined to pursue control persons (such as chief executive officers and chief financial
officers) of major financial enterprises that paid hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions,
in money penalties. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). I have addressed this failure in a previous article.
See Marc I. Steinberg & Forrest C. Roberts, Laxity at the Gates: The SEC’s Neglect to Enforce
Control Person Liability, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 (2017).
92. See, e.g., Steinberg & Roberts, supra note 91, at 217–28 (discussing proceedings).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).
94. See Steinberg & Roberts, supra note 91, at 247 (asserting that “with respect to the ‘big
players’ on Wall Street, the SEC has declined to pursue any individual liability at all, except
on rare occasions”).
95. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dall., 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975).
96. See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 651 (1988) (In ascertaining the definition of
the term “seller” under section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1), the
Supreme Court stated that application of a broad test “might expose securities professionals,
such as accountants and lawyers, whose involvement is only the performance of their
professional services [to liability].”).
97. See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text.
98. See MALLEN, supra note 11 (collecting cases).
99. See generally GLAZER ET AL., supra note 38.
100. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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duty by corporate officers and directors, actions against corporate counsel
premised on aiding and abetting occur with some frequency.101 As a last
example, the state securities laws provide recourse against corporate lawyers
who aid and abet their clients’ violations.102
This seeming expansive presence of state law to redress alleged corporate
counsel misconduct, however, is greatly exaggerated. First, as discussed
above, with few exceptions,103 state law does not apply to class actions
involving nationally traded securities.104 Hence, absent a SLUSA exception,
the state securities laws, as well as common law, are irrelevant in this
setting.105 Second, although some states have broader provisions,106 the
Uniform Securities Act107 (USA), adopted in some significant form by a
majority of states,108 only encompasses in-house counsel who aids and abets
a primary violation.109 Outside corporate counsel who engage in their
customary professional roles thus are not within the provision’s reach.110
Accordingly, under the USA, in-house and outside counsel can engage in
identical improper conduct, yet only in-house counsel is subject to liability
in private litigation.111 This clear gap in gatekeeper liability is antithetical to
investor protection.112 Third, although corporate counsel may be subject to
liability as aiders and abettors under state common law,113 such liability is
predicated in many states on actual knowledge rather than reckless
conduct.114 Proof of an attorney’s actual knowledge is frequently
problematic.115 And last, in a small number of states, courts have invoked
101. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 54 for examples of these exceptions.
104. This consequence is due to the application of SLUSA. See supra notes 52–53 and
accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
106. For example, Texas has an aider provision that encompasses any person who
materially aids with reckless disregard of the truth. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 58133(F)(1) (West 2020).
107. Currently, there are three versions of the USA. Evidently, the most widely adopted is
the USA of 1956. See UNIF. SEC. ACT prefatory note (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 2002)
108. Some version of the USA has been adopted by approximately forty states. STEINBERG,
supra note 6, § 5.03[1]; see also Marc I. Steinberg & Chris Claassen, Attorney Liability Under
the State Securities Laws: Landscapes and Minefields, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2005).
109. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
1956).
110. See, e.g., Bennett v. Durham, 683 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Kentucky law).
111. To come within the scope of section 410(b), an attorney who materially aids must be
an employee of the subject “seller.” This provision thus encompasses in-house counsel but
not outside law firms and their lawyers.
112. For elaboration on this subject, see Steinberg & Ames, supra note 22, at 39–47.
113. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
114. See generally Eurycleia Partners LP v. Seward Kissel, LLP, 910 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y.
2009).
115. Nonetheless, state court actions against corporate attorneys occur with some
frequency. In a number of states, an attorney also may incur liability based on conspiracy.
See, e.g., Siegmund v. Bian, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55725 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2018) (applying
Florida law).
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the attorney immunity doctrine to protect corporate counsel against claims
brought against them by nonclients—even based on fraud and violations of
the applicable state’s securities laws—so long as such counsel acted within
the scope of client representation.116
The inescapable conclusion is that state law remains pertinent in the
corporate attorney context with respect to malpractice suits, actions by
nonclients based on negligent misrepresentation, and individual actions in
certain states based on fraud, as well as aider and abettor liability.117
Otherwise, corporate attorney liability under state law largely is
nonexistent.118 Moreover, generally, the state bar disciplinary authorities
have lacked vigilance in holding miscreant lawyers accountable for their
misconduct.119
E. The Lack of Accountability
In view of the preceding discussion, one may logically conclude that
although ethical precepts are plentiful with respect to the corporate attorney,
relatively little meaningful enforcement currently exists. The current lack of
enforcement stands in marked contrast to the days of yesteryear when more
rigorous standards were implemented in both private and government
litigation.120 This absence of accountability has little bearing on the great
majority of corporate lawyers who act with competence and integrity.121 But
the absence of meaningful enforcement enables miscreant lawyers to
perpetrate misdeeds upon investors and other affected persons who are
without adequate redress. This outcome is detrimental to investors, our
securities markets, and the public’s perceptions of corporate attorneys. 122
II. THIS COLLOQUIUM’S ARTICLES
In this Issue of the Fordham Law Review, timely contributions are
authored by preeminent academicians focusing on the corporate lawyer. The
following discussion provides a succinct overview of each article.
116. See, e.g., Troice v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP., 921 F.3d 501, 507–08 (5th Cir. 2019)
(applying Texas law). For criticism of this broad immunity doctrine, see generally Marc I.
Steinberg & Logan J. Weissler, The Litigation Privilege as a Shelter for Miscreant Legal
Counsel, 97 OR. L. REV. 1 (2018).
117. See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text.
118. This is certainly true when the provisions of SLUSA apply. See supra notes 51–55
and accompanying text.
119. See Steinberg & Weissler, supra note 116, at 44–45 (setting forth statistics regarding
state disciplinary proceedings against attorneys and stating that “state bar associations have
shown themselves hesitant to hold attorneys accountable for alleged misconduct”).
120. See supra notes 21–42 and accompanying text.
121. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1986) (“Lawyers, more than
the members of any other profession, enjoy power, prestige, income, and the genuine affection
of both clients and nonclients.”). But see Megan Brenan, Nurses Keep Healthy Lead as
Honest, Ethical Profession, GALLUP (Dec. 26, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/224639/
nurses-keep-healthy-lead-honest-ethical-profession.aspx
[https://perma.cc/D8HU-4N6D]
(ranking attorneys sixteenth out of twenty-two professions polled).
122. See generally Marc I. Steinberg, The Corporate/Securities Attorney as a “Moving
Target”—Client Fraud Dilemmas, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2006).
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A. Miriam H. Baer: “Compliance Elites”
Professor Miriam H. Baer’s essay addresses the emergence of an elite
cadre of lawyers increasingly attaining the positions of chief compliance
officers (CCOs) at publicly held enterprises.123 She focuses on the positive
aspects of this development, as well as the inherent drawbacks of a legal elite
attaining the compliance seat. The essay posits that, while this development
is beneficial, there exist drawbacks due to the elite compliance officer’s
“performance blind spots.”124
Professor Baer’s essay contains three distinct discussions. First, she
highlights the impressive growth of the corporate world of compliance that
is forecast to exceed $50 billion within the next five years.125 This growth
has facilitated the emergence of elite attorneys serving as CCOs and
consultants.126 Second, she addresses and synthesizes the positive aspects
that accrue to corporations and other business enterprises that retain elite
compliance personnel.127 Third, Professor Baer focuses on certain
drawbacks of this development.128
In theory, more talented professionals should result in more effective
overall compliance.129 On the other hand, Professor Baer argues, precisely
because the elite attorney has been such a superb performer throughout her
career, she may not be the best compliance gatekeeper.130 Due to her high
level of achievement, she may not be as apt to flag performance regimes
whose characteristics (high pressure, high variability between hitting one’s
targets and falling just shy of them) pose enhanced risks of unethical
conduct.131 Because the elite attorney has always performed at a high level,
she is unable to recognize the extent to which a high-stakes performance
requirement induces cheating, fraud, corruption, or other hallmarks of
noncompliance. At the same time, the elite attorney may also be less primed
to recognize performance that is just too good to be true.132 Collectively,
these “performance blind spots” impede the elite lawyer from recognizing
unethical behavior and from correcting the conditions that promote such
behavior.133
Professor Baer ends her essay with a recognition that compliance elites are
here to stay.134 Recognizing this fact, she suggests that such elite CCOs and
other compliance personnel engage in additional deliberation with an eye
towards debiasing themselves of their blind spots.135 She theorizes as well
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See generally Miriam H. Baer, Compliance Elites, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599 (2020).
Id. at 1602–05.
Id. at 1607.
Id. at 1607–14.
Id. at 1614–17.
Id. at 1617.
Id. at 1605–07.
Id. at 1623–25.
Id.
Id. at 1624–25.
Id. at 1626–28.
Id. at 1629–30.
Id. at 1627–29.
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that strong internal reporting programs that reward employee whistleblowers
may be additionally valuable in alerting compliance personnel that their
companies’ high achievers—and their high performance standards—merit a
greater degree of skepticism and at least a second (or third) look.136
B. Claire Hill, Brett McDonnell & Aaron Stenz: “Bad Agent, Good
Citizen?”
The next article by Professor Claire Hill, Professor Brett McDonnell, and
Aaron Stenz focuses on the role of attorneys in client representation as good
or bad agents, as well as good or bad citizens.137 The authors address the
duties owed by an attorney as agent to her client and whether such attorney’s
conduct makes her a good or bad citizen based on the positive or negative
effects her advice has on society.138 The authors posit that attorneys have
duties to society and that their advice may prove injurious to society
irrespective of whether they act as good or bad agents.139 Accordingly,
reconsideration of the attorney’s role is merited when a lawyer acts as a bad
citizen even if she serves as a good agent to her client.140
Within this framework, the authors describe four situations: bad agent/bad
citizen, bad agent/good citizen, good agent/bad citizen, and good agent/good
citizen.141 Viewed generally, a bad agent is one who engages in self-serving
conduct and whose services are not truly beneficial to the principal.142 In
contrast, the good versus bad citizen distinction ascertains whether the
agent’s actions serve a public interest.143 As an example, the authors discuss
the bad agent/bad citizen attorney as one who initiates meritless lawsuits for
their settlement or nuisance value with the primary objective of procuring
attorney’s fees.144 Such cases provide little benefit to their clients and are
detrimental to the subject business enterprises and, on a broader scale,
society.145 As another example, with respect to the good agent/bad citizen
situation, the authors describe an attorney who renders legal advice to her
client that, while law compliant, violates the spirit of the law—such as an
attorney who counsels a client to benefit from a regulatory loophole that
exists due to legislative or regulatory inadvertence or new developments that
make the loophole attractive to the client.146
136. Id. at 1628–29.
137. See generally Claire Hill et al., Bad Agent, Good Citizen?, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1631
(2020).
138. Id. at 1631–34.
139. Id. at 1631–32.
140. Id. at 1634.
141. Id. at 1633.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1632–33.
144. Id. at 1634–38.
145. To the extent that these actions facilitate enhanced standards of corporate governance
and improve the quality of disclosures made to investors, my view is that they are beneficial
to the corporation, shareholders, and society. If these benefits eventuate, then it may be
posited that the attorney is acting as a good agent as well as a good citizen.
146. Hill et al., supra note 137, at 1638–40.
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Concerning the two remaining situations—bad agent/good citizen and
good agent/good citizen—the authors provide the example of corporate
directors and officers seeking to adhere to their obligations with respect to
environmental law compliance.147 Counseling compliance with best
practices that exceed minimal regulatory mandates may not serve the subject
company’s best interests of profit maximization but nonetheless may portray
the attorney as a good citizen.148 Moreover, if adherence to best practices
indeed serves the company’s long-term best interests, such as by enhancing
its reputation or deterring the promulgation of more onerous government
regulation, the lawyer acts as both a good agent and a good citizen.149
C. Cathy Hwang: “Value Creation by Transactional Associates”
Professor Cathy Hwang’s article addresses a timely and thus far
unexplored subject: how transactional law firm associates bring value to
deals.150 While a number of previous works have focused on the role of law
firm partners in this context, there has not been examination of the value that
transactional associates bring to the table. In her article, Professor Hwang
discusses the value-added functions that law firm associates perform in the
transactional setting.
As Professor Hwang discusses, functioning in their role as contract
designers, law firm partners add value by enhancing the efficiency of the
dealmaking process.151 The various contracts integral to a deal have many
working parts, which normally are unbundled into simpler parts to increase
efficiency.152 Transactional associates serve as conduits with respect to these
unbundled moving parts.153 As conduits to this process, for example,
associates must communicate with specialists (such as tax attorneys) who
provide input for a specified aspect of the transaction. Moreover, with many
individuals simultaneously working on a subject transaction, different
terminology and definitions in the drafting process are employed.154 It is the
associate’s function to harmonize the final documents in a uniform and
cohesive manner. Hence, transactional associates act as conduits for multiple
contract modules while also seeking to mitigate the limitations of modularity
that arise. Professor Hwang accordingly posits that not only do transactional
associates add value but that this value is particularly meaningful.155

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1640–42.
Id. at 1641–42.
Id. at 1647–48.
See generally Cathy Hwang, Value Creation by Transactional Associates, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 1649 (2020).
151. Id. at 1651.
152. For an earlier excellent article by Professor Hwang on this subject, see Cathy Hwang,
Unbundled Bargains: Multi-agreement Dealmaking in Complex Mergers and Acquisitions,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403 (2016).
153. Hwang, supra note 150, at 1657.
154. Id. at 1659–61.
155. Id. at 1661.
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Professor Hwang concludes her article by observing that, while concerns
abound that automation will displace law firm associates, machines at this
time cannot effectively replicate the associate’s function as a conduit for the
effectuation of successful transactions.156 It is the transactional associates
who can effectively reintegrate the many working parts of a deal into a
cohesive framework.157
D. Sung Hui Kim: “Economic Inequality, Access to Law, and Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements: A Comment on the Standard Conception of the
Lawyer’s Role”
In her article, Professor Sung Hui Kim argues that some of the leading
defenses of the “standard conception of the lawyer’s role,” which combines
the principles of partisanship and neutrality, cannot withstand the “economic
inequality” objection—the objection that the moral praiseworthiness of the
standard conception cannot be reconciled with a legal system that is so
marred by gross economic inequality that only the wealthy have access to
lawyers and the wealthy routinely use lawyers to undermine the public
interest or to exploit others who cannot afford lawyers themselves.158 She
reviews some of the leading defenses of the standard conception and its
principle of neutrality that are grounded in the value of autonomy.159
Although Professor Kim does not deny that some lawyers sometimes
perform morally laudable work or that morally restricting the provision of
legal services may impinge on the clients’ autonomy (in one sense), she
argues that these attempts to universally defend the standard conception on
autonomy grounds miss the mark.160 Their analyses lack appreciation for
how the principle of neutrality all too often interacts with the reality of the
disparate economic and bargaining strengths between the haves and the havenots to further exacerbate economic inequality.161 In particular, Professor
Kim argues that the principle of neutrality, with its insistence on morally
unrestricted lawyering, has operated in the employment context of large
corporations to foreclose access to counsel for the have-nots.162 Specifically,
this harm occurs through the widespread promulgation of predispute
mandatory arbitration agreements, which—as a condition of employment—
compel employees to waive their entitlement to bring their employmentrelated claims in court.163 Professor Kim argues that lawyers who adhere to
the principle of neutrality and facilitate the imposition of these agreements
on behalf of their employer-clients, are foreclosing employees’ access to
156. Id. at 1663.
157. Id.
158. See generally Sung Hui Kim, Economic Inequality, Access to Law, and Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements: A Comment on the Standard Conception of the Lawyer’s Role, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 1665 (2020).
159. Id. at 1667.
160. Id. at 1669–74.
161. Id. at 1672–74.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1674.
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lawyers and the law and are undermining their autonomy.164 Therefore, such
adherence impinges on the very value that the defenders of the standard
conception claim to embrace.165
E. Donald C. Langevoort: “Gatekeepers, Cultural Captives, or Knaves?:
Corporate Lawyers Through Different Lenses”
Professor Donald C. Langevoort’s essay focuses on two interesting
issues.166 First, he addresses the process by which ethical apathy can
overtake a corporate lawyer’s professional responsibilities.167 This part of
the essay focuses on a particular aspect of the cognitive science relevant to
lawyers caught “doing bad things”: the element of consciousness being more
of a continuum than either knowing or not having knowledge of the specific
wrongdoing.168 This concept implicates the “slippery slope” of awareness,
whereby an actor engages in a relatively minor transgression which he finds
ways to rationalize. Nonetheless, once this step is justified, it is now
perceived as permissible and as constituting the new defined baseline.169
Professor Langevoort posits that corporate attorneys are susceptible to the
slippery slope.170 Seeking to solve their clients’ legal problems, attorneys
may be incentivized to rationalize their conduct, making the slope even more
slippery.171 Hence, the corporate lawyer may downplay the existence and
significance of the ethical dilemmas presented until it is too late to extricate
the client and himself from the situation.172
Second, Professor Langevoort discusses the possible diminished interest
in ethical gatekeeping.173 He explores how lucrative financial incentives
may redirect a corporate counsel’s attention away from compliance to
facilitating strategic business development.174 The ascension of the general
counsel in prestige and status may serve to counteract this situation.175 With
the backing of the company’s chief executive officer and board of directors
that share this common objective, the general counsel may be poised to serve
as an effective conduit to reawaken the lawyer-gatekeeper role for both inhouse and law firm attorneys.176

164. Id. at 1680–81.
165. Id. at 1680–82.
166. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Gatekeepers, Cultural Captives, or Knaves?:
Corporate Lawyers Through Different Lenses, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683 (2020).
167. Id. at 1686–87.
168. Id. at 1687.
169. Id. at 1689.
170. Id. at 1692.
171. Id.
172. For an excellent article by Langevoort that applies social cognition research to
corporate counsel’s professional responsibilities, see generally Donald C. Langevoort, Where
Were the Lawyers?: A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Client Fraud, 46
VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993).
173. Langevoort, supra note 166, at 1686.
174. Id. at 1695.
175. Id. at 1686.
176. Id. at 1696–97.
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F. Nancy J. Moore: “Forming Start-Up Companies: Who’s My Client?”
Professor Nancy J. Moore addresses the ethical concerns of client
identification prior to the formation of a business entity and explores the
concept of entity representation prior to enterprise formation.177 In her
article, Professor Moore analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the
competing approaches.178 She concludes that the attorney should be held to
represent one or more of the founders rather than the entity.179 Of course,
such representation is subject to the ethical rules relating to the attorney as
intermediary.180 And, in any event, it would be prudent for legal counsel to
obtain an informed written agreement from the various constituents clearly
identifying who the lawyer’s clients are.181
As Professor Moore explains, when individuals approach an attorney to
form a business entity, the question arises: who is or are the client(s)—
namely, the individual founders, the nonexisting entity, or both the founders
and the nonexisting entity?182 Other issues also presented include, for
example, whether the lawyer continues to represent the founders after entity
formation and who the lawyer represents if the entity in fact is never
formed.183
In her article, Professor Moore examines the retroactive and prospective
theories of representation.184 The retroactive approach posits that the lawyer
is deemed retroactively to represent the entity once it is formed, with the
founders being neither former nor current clients of the lawyer.185 On the
other hand, under the prospective approach, the attorney, with appropriate
disclosures and consents, may represent solely the yet-to-be-formed
enterprise.186 Neither of these approaches adequately addresses who the
attorney represents if the entity in fact is never formed. Rejecting both of
these approaches, Professor Moore concludes that the lawyer should
represent one or more of the founders.187 In this setting, counsel should
identify and address any conflicts among the founders, obtain informed
consent from each affected founder, and explain the material issues that
impact their relationships once the entity is formed.188
177. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Forming Start-Up Companies: Who’s My Client?, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 1699 (2020).
178. Id. at 1700–01.
179. Id.
180. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmts. 28–33 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
181. A clear written agreement, providing the founders with the opportunity to seek
separate counsel to consult prior to the agreement’s execution, is a prudent measure for the
corporate lawyer to implement. Moreover, it may be beneficial for enterprise formation to
occur prior to the rendering of meaningful legal advice with respect to the relations among the
founders and between the founders and the subject entity. For further discussion, see MARC
I. STEINBERG, LAWYERING AND ETHICS FOR THE BUSINESS ATTORNEY (5th ed. 2020).
182. Moore, supra note 177, at 1700–01.
183. Id. at 1710–11.
184. Id. at 1707, 1715.
185. Id. at 1707–11.
186. Id. at 1715–18.
187. Id. at 1723–25.
188. Id.
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G. Nancy B. Rapoport: “Using General Counsel to Set the Tone for Work
in Large Chapter 11 Cases”
Professor Nancy B. Rapoport’s article focuses on the role of a
corporation’s general counsel in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy context—either
the debtor’s general counsel or the general counsel of one of the creditors.189
Bankruptcy is a complicated process involving many outside professionals.
There is a disconnect between the objectives of a reorganizing business and
those being paid, often lucratively, in their professional roles. Who is best
suited to keep these costs reasonable? Professor Rapoport believes that a
general counsel can encourage better behavior by stressing her billing
values.190
As Professor Rapoport explains, the way fees are paid in the Chapter 11
context differs from other professional fees because they are paid either as a
priority administrative expense (in other words, before general creditors get
paid) or from a carve-out of a secured creditor’s collateral.191 Although the
court must approve these fees and expenses, Professor Rapoport observes
that these requests are ordinarily accepted.192 While some courts have
become more proactive in overseeing this process, and although the larger
cases often use fee examiners to assist the court’s review of fees, a company’s
general counsel can also play a key role. By expressing her views and values
about professionals’ billing behavior, the general counsel can set a clear
benchmark for reasonable fees and expenses.193 Although the Chapter 11
process likely is unfamiliar to the general counsel, as the company’s highestranking legal officer, she has a unique oversight opportunity to convey clear,
values-based discussions with the outside professionals.194 By engaging in
such dialogue, Professor Rapoport reasons that a general counsel can
establish the foundation for a more cost-effective bankruptcy process.195
H. Omari Scott Simmons: “Chief Legal Officer 5.0”
Professor Omari Scott Simmons’s essay focuses on the contemporary role
of the chief legal officer (CLO) in value creation.196 He focuses on three
areas where the CLO creates value for the subject corporation: (1) through
sophisticated purchasing competencies with respect to the retention of and
negotiation with outside legal service providers, including outside law firms;
(2) by placing greater demands on in-house lawyers and to articulate the legal
department’s value to corporate managers; and (3) by engaging in astute

189. See generally Nancy B. Rapoport, Using General Counsel to Set the Tone for Work
in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1727 (2020).
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192. Id. at 1727–28.
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194. Id. at 1731–33.
195. Id. at 1739.
196. See generally Omari Scott Simmons, Chief Legal Officer 5.0, 88 FORDHAM L. REV.
1741 (2020).
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global enterprise risk management and thereby having a positive impact on
capturing and preserving economic value.197
For example, as Professor Simmons observes, it is frequently the CLO’s
responsibility to determine whether to purchase legal services from an
outside legal service provider and to procure these services at the appropriate
quality and cost. Ascertaining the quality and cost of legal services, however,
may present challenges.198 In this respect, the CLO provides value by taking
measures such as mitigating the client’s information gaps, playing a key role
in developing appropriate strategies, and determining whether the client
should bundle legal services.199 With respect to outside legal service
providers outside of the United States, Professor Simmons points to their
increased use by general counsel when conducting business abroad due to
their low-cost, high-volume work level.200
The CLO, as Professor Simmons explains, provides an enhanced financial
focus. While some sources view legal departments as non-revenue
generating, in actuality, the legal department generates revenue and the CLO
should convey that reality to management.201 After all, value is created by
mitigating transactional and litigation costs. By wisely ascertaining which
claims the corporation should pursue or by negotiating improved fee
arrangements to better fit the company’s needs, the CLO is a value creator
for the corporate enterprise.202
Professor Simmons also focuses on the CLO’s enterprise risk-management
function. Understanding applicable law, business operations, and company
culture, the CLO is well positioned to understand the risks that are
presented.203 This understanding ultimately adds value for the corporation,
as astute risk-management practices significantly enhance the corporation’s
avoidance of liability exposure, government sanctions, and business
disruptions.204
I. Eli Wald: “Getting In and Out of the House: The Worlds of In-House
Counsel, Big Law, and Emerging Career Trajectories of In-House
Lawyers”
Professor Eli Wald’s article addresses the role and status of in-house
lawyers over the past 150 years, the current symbiotic relationship between
in-house counsel and Big Law, and the current career pathways both inside
and outside the house.205 The article thoroughly examines the ever-evolving
197. Id. at 1743–44.
198. Id. at 1745–46.
199. Id. at 1745–48.
200. Id. at 1751–52.
201. Id. at 1753.
202. Id. at 1756–57.
203. Id. at 1757–58.
204. Id. at 1757–62.
205. See generally Eli Wald, Getting In and Out of the House: The Worlds of In-House
Counsel, Big Law, and Emerging Career Trajectories of In-House Lawyers, 88 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1765 (2020).
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role and opportunities available to in-house counsel, dating from the post–
Civil War era to the present. Indeed, as Professor Wald explains, after the
Civil War, old-school, in-house counsel were among the most highly
compensated corporate employees who often were destined to become chief
executive officers.206 This situation subsequently changed. From the 1940s
to the 1970s, with the professionalization of corporate management, as well
as the increased dominance of prestigious large law firms, in-house counsel
no longer fit the new corporate culture.207 The elite outside law firms
assumed the new general counsel positions. During the 1970s through the
2000s, the pendulum swung back toward in-house counsel, who offered
intimate inside knowledge of the corporation and its legal needs, as well as
the promise of reduced legal costs.208
Unlike prior periods, these new in-house counsel attended elite law schools
and were previously employed and socialized at prestigious, large law firms.
With no differing professional values or animosity existing between in-house
and Big Law, a beneficial symbiotic relationship emerged.209 Professor
Wald’s symbiotic account of the relationship between in-house and outside
counsel thus rejects the standard story, pursuant to which in-house counsel
triumphed over Big Law lawyers in a zero-sum game and replaced them as
the main providers of corporate legal services.210
Professor Wald’s contribution, however, goes beyond correcting the
historical record. Rather, his symbiotic model explains current, seemingly
puzzling phenomena regarding corporate counsel, namely, the continued
success of Big Law and the mixed record of in-house counsel exercising
control over outside counsel.211 Because in-house counsel and Big Law
depend on each other and in some instances offer complementary services as
opposed to substitutes, the success of in-house attorneys is consistent with
the continued success of large law firms and with sharing some power and
control over corporate legal services with Big Law.212
Perhaps of greatest interest to today’s practicing lawyers and law students
is Professor Wald’s discussion of the dynamically changing career path
opportunities that corporate lawyers now have available to them. The
symbiotic model reveals that rather than a one-way street exodus from Big
Law to in-house departments, these avenues include moves from law firms
to corporations, corporations to law firms, and from one corporation to
another. In this discussion, Professor Wald explains the varying challenges
and opportunities available to inside counsel as well as the diversity and
breadth of in-house practice.213

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 1767–68.
Id. at 1769–71.
Id. at 1771–75.
Id. at 1773–74.
Id. at 1782.
Id. at 1782–83.
Id. at 1785–86.
Id. at 1786–95.

1596

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

Interestingly, Professor Wald describes the motivating factors as to why a
Big Law attorney may elect to move “in-house.” The consequence is a
commingling of the worlds of in-house and Big Law.214 With the experience
of working with prestigious law firms permeating the in-house counsel’s
role, Professor Wald identifies the blurring of these conceptual lines. He
concludes by discussing the possible adverse and positive impact that this
development may have going forward on corporate law practice.215
J. David Yosifon, “Corporate Law as an Existential Project”
In this first piece of a larger project, Professor David Yosifon discusses the
existential significance of corporate law.216 The essay proposes corporate
law as a model for personal ethics, thereby setting the foundation of corporate
law as an existential project.217 But why corporate law? Professor Yosifon
reasons that humans yearn for meaning, but in modern society, the traditional
suppliers of meaning are considered suspect. Corporations, however, are
inescapably present in our civilization.218
In this essay, Professor Yosifon examines the law as a source of value and
meaning, focusing on corporate law. He explains this approach by thinking
about life in terms of what generates feelings of engagement, interest, energy,
and enthusiasm. Through this lens, Professor Yosifon advances the idea that
corporate law is a particularly powerful source of meaning to an existential
project.219
Professor Yosifon posits that this approach is supported by the backdrop
of the corporation, found intriguing by many sources due to its combination
of power and mystery. These monolithic enterprises, and the corporate law
that surrounds their existence, support his interpretation of that field in terms
of its ability to move people toward a better life.220 Professor Yosifon
examines these concepts from a number of perspectives, including law as a
source of connection and the application of legal ethical rules and duties,
such as the duty of loyalty that agents owe as fiduciaries to their principals
(as exists in the attorney-client relationship).221 The essay encapsulates
important yet challenging existential theories and applies them to attorneys
seeking to find meaning in their practice of corporate law. Professor Yosifon
finds ample support that there indeed is a great deal of value to be derived
from the practice of law, especially in the corporate context.222
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CONCLUSION
This important Colloquium Issue highlights the multifaceted functions,
roles, and obligations of the corporate lawyer. These insightful contributions
should have a prominent stature in the scholarly literature focusing on this
subject matter. While a number of the articles are addressed principally to
other academicians, others should prove useful as well to the practicing
corporate lawyer. This Issue accordingly has great breadth, encompassing
both theoretical and practical topics, identifying important unresolved
matters, and proffering concrete solutions to the dilemmas identified. I thank
the Fordham Law Review for inviting me to author the introductory article to
this superb Colloquium Issue.

